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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
CKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This is an appeal by plaintiff Robert Rogers from a 
district court final judgment in a civil rights action, 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, in favor of four Pennsylvania state police 
troopers who Rogers claims violated his civil rights by 
arresting him without probable cause and by using 
excessive force in connection with the arrest. The unlawful 
arrest claim was disposed of by summary judgment. The 
excessive force claim was tried to a jury which found for the 
defendants. We find no error in connection with the trial, 
and affirm summarily with respect to the excessive force 
claim. However, we find the existence of a triable fact with 
respect to aspects of the unlawful arrest claim against some 
of the defendants. 
 
More specifically, we conclude that the information 
received by Trooper James Edwards from Probation Officer 
Rita Miller about the supposed existence of an arrest 
warrant for Rogers was too insubstantial to justify 
detaining him. Moreover, because Edwards' reliance on the 
vague and inconclusive statements of a parole officer was 
not reasonable, he was not entitled to qualified immunity. 
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Thus, we reverse the grant of summary judgment as to 
Edwards. With respect to Trooper Timothy Eiler, who 
arrested Rogers along with Edwards based on Edwards' 
representation that there was a valid arrest warrant, we 
affirm the grant of summary judgment on the grounds that 
he is properly held entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
We also conclude that Troopers Jeffrey Stine and Kevin 
Powell, whose detention of Rogers was also based on 
Edwards' representation, are entitled to qualified immunity, 
but only up to the point at which they were informed that 
there was no reason to hold Rogers in custody. Their 
qualified immunity disappeared when they continued to 
detain him for approximately one hour thereafter. We 
therefore affirm in part and reverse in part with respect to 
Stine and Powell. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
On September 25, 1994, Troopers James Edwards and 
Timothy Eiler were working the midnight shift in Clinton 
County, Pennsylvania.1 Edwards was assigned to the desk 
while Eiler was on patrol with Trooper Dale Gillette. Prior to 
starting his shift, Edwards claims that he had spoken with 
Trooper Davy. During this conversation, Davy allegedly 
mentioned that there was a "court paper out on Rogers." 
The record, however, is devoid of any declaration or 
deposition by Davy, so we cannot confirm exactly what he 
said to Edwards. 
 
Later that evening Edwards received a report of afight in 
nearby Logantown in which Rogers was allegedly involved. 
Edwards dispatched Eiler and Gillette to the scene of the 
fight. When they arrived, Rogers was not present. Eiler and 
Gillette then began to search for him. At this point, because 
of Edwards' earlier conversation with Davy, as well as 
Rogers' alleged involvement in the Logantown fight, 
Edwards decided to determine if any warrants were pending 
for Rogers. 
 
Following Pennsylvania State Police procedure, Edwards 
contacted the Clinton County Communications Center 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The "midnight shift" began at 11 P.M. on September 25, and ended at 
7 A.M. on September 26. 
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which informed him that there were two summary warrants 
pending for Rogers. Additionally, Edwards said he was 
informed that there might be other "open" paperwork on 
Rogers from the Clinton County Probation Office. As a 
result, Edwards called the probation office and requested 
that the officer on duty that evening contact him. Edwards 
then contacted Eiler and Gillette and told them not to pick 
up Rogers if they found him because the only warrants of 
whose existence Edwards knew were summary warrants. 
When an individual is arrested for outstanding summary 
offense warrants, he must be taken to appear before the 
proper issuing authority "without delay." Pa. R. Cr. P. 
76(b)(4). Therefore, officers typically do not arrest an 
individual during the late evening or early morning hours 
for outstanding summary offense warrants because they 
are reluctant to awaken the district justice on duty. 
 
Later that night, Rita Miller, from the Clinton County 
Probation Office responded to Edwards' call. She too 
advised Edwards of the two summary warrants. Miller also 
stated that Trooper Davy wanted Rogers "because he [Davy] 
said that Lycoming County said that they'll hold him as an 
absconding witness."2 Edwards maintains that this 
statement gave him the belief that there was a warrant for 
Rogers' arrest in Lycoming County. 
 
A transcript of the conversation between Edwards and 
Miller, prepared by police communications officer Ruth 
Eoute at the request of Sergeant Salinas of the 
Pennsylvania State Police, the accuracy of which is not 
disputed by any of the parties, supports Miller's claim that 
she never confirmed the existence of a warrant for Rogers' 
arrest in Lycoming County: 
 
Edwards:   State Police, Tpr. Edwards. 
 
Miller:    Hi, it's Rita Miller. 
 
Edwards:   Rita? 
 
Miller:    Yeah. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5125 (West 1983) (dealing with 
"absconding witnesses" and defining the offense as a misdemeanor of the 
third degree). 
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Edwards:   Do you want Robert Rogers? 
 
Miller:    There's a warrant out for him. It's a 
           summary warrant. Davy wants him. 
           Because he says that Lycoming County 
           said that they'll have him as an 
           absconding witness. 
 
Edwards:   Who will? Lycoming County? 
 
Miller:    Yeah. Because he's to testify against 
           Doctor Bender in the hearing. 
 
Edwards:   Mm Hm. 
 
Miller:    Okay. And also I think there's two 
           warrants out from Lycoming County.3 I 
           think they're both from Frazier's office. 
           One's for Hit and Run over at (inaudible) 
           and one's for assaulting that guy and they 
           charged him with harassment. So he has 
           two summary warrants. Do you have 
           them? Copies of the warrants. 
 
Edwards:   No. The Comm. Center does. 
 
Miller:    Okay. No. I don't have him on any more 
           because they left him off of probation after 
           giving him that deal. You know, if he would 
           testify? 
 
Edwards:   Yeah. 
 
Miller:    So I don't have anything on him any more. 
           Do you guys have him? 
 
Edwards:   No. He's with Mike Marshall tonight and 
           Gilly Stevenson and they're causing some 
           shit. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In her sworn deposition, Miller stated that she misspoke at this point 
in the conversation with Edwards. Frazier is a district justice in Clinton 
County, so it seems clear from the context of the conversation that Miller 
intended to say "there's two warrants out from Clinton County" when in 
fact she said "there's two warrants out from Lycoming County." We 
conclude from Edwards' response that he, too, understood that Miller 
meant to refer to Clinton County, rather that Lycoming County at this 
point in the conversation. (Appellees' Supplemental Appendix, p. 169). 
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Miller:    Mm Hm. 
 
Edwards:   So, uh, the one guy that was out on the 
           road (inaudible) 
 
Miller:    Mm Hm. 
 
Edwards:   So they went to look to get him again and 
           he had left. So they're going down to a 
           place in Flemington to see if they're down 
           there. 
 
Miller:    Okay. 
 
Edwards:   So then if they get him, definitely pick him 
           up. Yes? 
 
Miller:    Yeah. They can pick him up on the 
           warrants and then they can let Lycoming 
           County know and they were going to put 
           like high bail on him to hold him so that 
           he'd be able to testify at the trial. 
 
Edwards:   Okay. If we're going to pick him up for the 
           warrants, what are we to do, take him to 
           Lycoming County or take him here? 
 
Miller:    You better bring him here. And then get 
           ahold of Trooper Davy and let him get 
           ahold of Lycoming County and let them 
           know. Because he said (inaudible), Davy 
           did. 
 
Edwards:   This is Bob Rogers the third? 
 
Miller:    Yep. 
 
Edwards:   Okay. Okay. 
 
Miller:    Okay? 
 
Edwards:   Go back to sleep. 
 
Miller:    Thanks. 
 
Edwards:   Bye. 
 
Miller:    Bye. 
 
After this conversation, Edwards radioed Gillette and Eiler 
and told them that if they found Rogers, they should arrest 
him. Gillette and Eiler did not locate Rogers that evening. 
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The following evening, Edwards, Eiler, and Gillette were 
again working the midnight shift. This time Edwards and 
Eiler were on patrol and Gillette was on desk duty. At 
approximately 2:40 A.M., Gillette dispatched Eiler and 
Edwards to Dr. Barry Bender's residence. When they 
arrived at the residence, Bender informed the two troopers 
that they were not needed. Edwards and Eiler left, but 
returned within twenty minutes after Gillette again 
dispatched them to Bender's residence because Rogers was 
creating a disturbance inside Bender's house. After 
receiving consent to enter, Edwards and Eiler arrested 
Rogers inside. When Rogers demanded to see the warrant 
for his arrest, Edwards replied that he did not have the 
warrant and that Rogers would see it when he arrived at 
the Montoursville State Police Barracks in Lycoming 
County. Edwards and Eiler left Bender's residence with 
Rogers at 3:19 A.M. 
 
While en route to Lycoming County, Edwards contacted 
Gillette and requested that Gillette arrange for a patrol car 
to meet them at the Clinton/Lycoming County line. Gillette 
then contacted the dispatch officer in Lycoming County, 
Police Communications Officer James Pfleegor, to request 
that he send a patrol car to the county line. Gillette 
informed Pfleegor that Rogers was being transferred to their 
custody because there was an outstanding warrant or 
detainer waiting for him at Lycoming County Prison. At 
approximately 3:54 A.M., Pfleegor dispatched Troopers 
Stine and Powell to the county line to transport Rogers to 
Lycoming County Prison. Edwards and Eiler took Rogers to 
the county line and transferred him to the custody of Stine 
and Powell. Stine and Powell did not personally know 
Edwards or Eiler, or know of Rogers before this transfer. 
When Stine and Powell took Rogers into their custody, they 
noticed that he was belligerent and appeared to be 
intoxicated. 
 
While en route to the Lycoming County Prison, Stine and 
Powell radioed Pfleegor and requested that he notify the 
prison that they would be arriving shortly with Rogers and 
that the prison should begin to prepare any necessary 
paperwork. Pfleegor radioed back a short time later and 
informed Stine and Powell that the prison could not locate 
 
                                7 
an outstanding warrant or detainer for Rogers' arrest. 
According to Stine and Powell, they did not immediately 
release Rogers after receiving Pfleegor's message because 
they were unclear as to whether an outstanding warrant or 
detainer for Rogers' arrest existed. Instead, they drove to 
the Montoursville Barracks to clarify the situation. 
 
Once they reached the barracks, both troopers took 
Rogers upstairs to the patrol room. It was at this point that 
the incident occurred between Stine and Rogers giving rise 
to the excessive force claim. Stine then sat Rogers into a 
chair, placed handcuffs on him, and connected him to a 
chain on the floor. Rogers fell asleep. 
 
While Rogers was sleeping, Powell spoke with Nancy 
Butts, an assistant district attorney of Lycoming County. 
Butts advised Powell that there was no outstanding bench 
warrant or detainer for Rogers' arrest in Lycoming County 
and that since they had no reason to hold Rogers they 
should release him and transport him back to the county 
line. 
 
At some point after 5:45 A.M., notwithstanding Butt's 
advice, Powell and Stine transported Rogers in handcuffs 
back to the county line. Edwards, Eiler, and Davy met Stine 
and Powell at the county line. Rogers remained in 
handcuffs until he was released back to Edwards, Eiler, 
and Davy at approximately 6:04 A.M. Rogers was finally 
dropped off, at his request, at the Dunkin Donuts in Lock 
Haven, Clinton County at approximately 6:25 A.M. 
 
Rogers brought suit against Powell, Stine, Eiler, and 
Edwards pursuant to § 1983, alleging that the officers 
violated his right to be free from unlawful seizures under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.4  The defendants 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In addition to his unlawful seizure claims against all four defendants, 
Rogers brought two claims solely against Stine. First, Rogers brought a 
§ 1983 claim against Stine arising out of an incident at the Montoursville 
Barracks alleging that Stine violated his right to be free from excessive 
force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Stine moved for 
summary judgment as to this excessive force claim, but the District 
Court denied Stine's motion. The claim went to trial and the jury entered 
a verdict in favor of Stine. Rogers asserts that the district court erred in 
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moved for summary judgment on the grounds that no 
genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to the 
issue of whether the troopers had probable cause to arrest 
Rogers without a warrant. The district court agreed, and 
granted the defendants' motion. 
 
The district court properly exercised its jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; we exercise appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the 
district court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. 
Ersek v. Township of Springfield, 102 F.3d 79, 83 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
II. The Unlawful Arrest Claim 
 
We begin our inquiry by examining the question whether 
the arrest of Rogers was unlawful and thus violated his 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unlawful 
seizure. That the defendants may have violated the Fourth 
Amendment does not end our inquiry, however. They will 
be liable for damages only if the doctrine of qualified 
immunity does not protect them. 
 
A. The Applicable Rules 
 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from 
arresting a citizen except upon probable cause. Orsatti v. 
New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 
(1972)). In Pennsylvania, "[n]o arrest warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause . . ." Pa. R. Cr. Pr. 119. The 
gravamen of Rogers' claim is that he was arrested without 
the requisite probable cause. The crux of the defendants' 
argument is that Edwards' mistaken belief that an arrest 
warrant had issued for Rogers supplied the probable cause 
required by the Fourth Amendment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
refusing to allow him to offer evidence during the trial that he suffered 
some type of injury or damage during the incident. We find this claim 
patently without merit. 
 
Rogers also brought a pendent state law assault claim against Trooper 
Stine. The district court granted Stine's motion for summary judgment 
as to this claim on sovereign immunity grounds. Rogers did not appeal 
this ruling. 
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"[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and 
circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge are 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to 
believe that an offense has been or is being committed by 
the person to be arrested." Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 483. The 
district court found that no genuine issue of material fact 
existed with respect to whether the officers had probable 
cause to arrest Rogers without a warrant because Edwards' 
conversations with Davy and Miller supplied him with the 
"facts and circumstances" necessary to support his finding 
of probable cause to arrest Rogers. 
 
The district court's conclusion was legally erroneous 
because statements by fellow officers conveying that there 
is probable cause for a person's arrest, by themselves, 
cannot provide the "facts and circumstances" necessary to 
support a finding of probable cause. Whitely v. Warden, 401 
U.S. 560, 568 (1971) ("[A]n otherwise illegal arrest cannot 
be insulated from challenge by the decision of the 
instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the 
arrest."). Probable cause exists only if the statements made 
by fellow officers are supported by actual facts that satisfy 
the probable cause standard. In United States v. Hensley, 
469 U.S. 221 (1985) the Court held that the lawfulness of 
a seizure made in reliance on the statements of fellow 
officers 
 
turns on whether the officers who issued the 
[statements] possessed probable cause to make the 
arrest. It does not turn on whether those relying on the 
[statements] were themselves aware of the specific facts 
which led their colleagues to seek their assistance. 
 
Id. at 231. 
 
Thus, the required basis for a lawful seizure where police 
rely on the statements of fellow officers is as follows. The 
legality of a seizure based solely on statements issued by 
fellow officers depends on whether the officers who issued 
the statements possessed the requisite basis to seize the 
suspect. Id. at 231. Moreover, an officer can lawfully act 
solely on the basis of statements issued by fellow officers if 
the officers issuing the statements possessed the facts and 
circumstances necessary to support a finding of the 
requisite basis. Id. at 232. 
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We now apply these teachings to the facts to determine 
whether Rogers' Fourth Amendment rights were violated as 
a result of his arrest. 
 
B. Lawfulness of the Arrest in this Case 
 
We conclude that the arrest of Rogers was unlawful. 
Edwards had no knowledge of any facts or circumstances to 
support his own independent determination that probable 
cause to arrest Rogers existed.5 He relied solely on the 
statements made by Davy and Miller in arresting Rogers. 
However, it is clear that neither Davy nor Miller had 
knowledge of the requisite facts and circumstances 
necessary to support a finding of probable cause to arrest 
Rogers. 
 
Edwards arrested Rogers on the basis of the supposed 
Lycoming County arrest warrants. The undisputed facts 
make clear that no warrant existed in Lycoming County for 
Rogers' arrest. Miller did not confirm the existence of any 
Lycoming County warrants. Miller did nothing more than 
relate her awareness of rumors that were circulating about 
the possibility that an arrest warrant had issued, or was 
going to issue for Rogers in Lycoming County.6 At one 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We reject the appellee's suggestion that because Edwards could have 
lawfully arrested Rogers on the basis of two outstanding summary 
warrants in Clinton County, he possessed the requisite probable cause. 
It is clear from Edwards' signed declaration and the circumstances of 
Rogers' arrest that the summary warrants were not the basis for the 
arrest. 
 
We acknowledge that an arrest is not rendered invalid by the fact that 
the basis for the arrest, though legitimate, was merely pretextual. See 
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996). In other words, 
had Edwards actually arrested Rogers on the basis of the summary 
warrants, even though he had subjectively arrested Rogers based on a 
non-existing Lycoming County warrant, he might have had the requisite 
probable cause. However, Edwards did not articulate the legitimate basis 
for the arrest (the Clinton County summary warrants) at the time of the 
seizure, nor did he advance it as a justification for the arrest at any 
point in the proceedings prior to this appeal. Although we do not reach 
the issue, we would be troubled by an argument suggesting that a 
legitimate basis for an arrest identified only after the arrest would 
provide sufficient grounds therefor. 
6. The only clear statement Miller made to Edwards concerning the 
existence of arrest warrants for Rogers referred to the Clinton County 
summary warrants, but those warrants were not the basis for Rogers' 
arrest. 
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point, she said "So I don't have anything on him anymore." 
There is no information in the record about Davy's 
communication with Edwards, except that Miller said that 
Davy said that Lycoming County said that they'll have him 
as an absconding witness. That is "thin soup", as the old 
saying goes. Therefore, Edwards relied solely on his fellow 
officers' statements in arresting Rogers on the basis of a 
Lycoming County arrest warrant, and none of those officers 
had knowledge of facts and circumstances to support an 
independent finding of probable cause. 
 
Eiler, Stine, and Powell, like Edwards, had no knowledge 
of facts or circumstances sufficient to support an 
independent determination of probable cause to arrest 
Rogers; all of them relied on the statements of others. Eiler, 
Stine, and Powell relied solely on the statements of 
Edwards in determining that there was probable cause. 
Although there will be differences when we address the 
question of qualified immunity, at this juncture the 
significant question remains the same: did the officer 
making the statements (in this case Edwards) have 
knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant 
a conclusion of probable cause? As we have already 
concluded, the answer is no. Thus, under Whitely  and 
Hensley, Eiler, Stine, and Powell, like Edwards, did not 
have probable cause to arrest Rogers, and as a result, the 
arrest was unlawful and violated Rogers' Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizures. 
 
III. Qualified Immunity 
 
A. The Applicable Rules 
 
Despite unlawfully arresting Rogers and violating his 
Fourth Amendment rights, the defendants may still be 
shielded from civil liability by the doctrine of qualified 
immunity.7 The doctrine of qualified immunity protects 
"government officials performing discretionary functions . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The district court never reached the qualified immunity question 
because it determined that the officers had lawfully arrested Rogers. 
However, since the qualified immunity issue is primarily a question of 
law and was raised by the defendants in both their motions for summary 
judgment and their appeal, we will address the issue. 
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from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The 
reasoning behind the doctrine is that "[r]eliance on the 
objective reasonableness of an official's conduct, as 
measured by reference to clearly established law, should 
avoid excessive disruptions of government and permit the 
resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary 
judgment." Id. (footnote omitted). 
 
Whether a government official is entitled to protection 
under the doctrine of qualified immunity is a"purely legal 
question." Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 609 (3d Cir. 
1994). The appropriate inquiry is as follows: 
 
On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may 
determine, not only the currently applicable law, but 
whether that law was clearly established at the time an 
action occurred. If the law at that time was not clearly 
established, an official could not reasonably be 
expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, 
nor could he fairly be said to "know" that the law 
forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. 
. . . If the law was clearly established, the immunity 
defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably 
competent public official should know the law 
governing his conduct. 
 
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. Moreover, "[t]he contours of 
the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 
would understand that what he is doing violates that right." 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
 
The closest case to the one at bar is Capone v. Marinelli, 
868 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1989). In Capone, a police officer 
took an affidavit alleging probable cause for arrest based on 
criminal conduct attributed to Capone. Id. at 103. An arrest 
warrant was issued, the details of which were entered into 
the National Crime Information Center computer system 
which sent out an electronically transmitted bulletin across 
the country. Id. The bulletin clearly stated that Capone was 
wanted for kidnapping and other offenses, and that a 
warrant had been issued for his arrest. Id. Two days later 
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a police officer from a different Pennsylvania county 
arrested Capone in reliance on that bulletin. Id. 
 
We granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, 
holding that a "police officer who reasonably relies upon a 
bulletin that establishes the existence of a warrant for 
arrest is entitled to qualified immunity in a civil rights 
action brought against him for unlawful arrest and 
prosecution." Id. at 104. Our decision relied heavily on the 
dicta in Whitely and Hensley. In Whitely, the Court stated: 
 
We do not, of course, question that the . . . police were 
entitled to act on the strength of the radio bulletin. 
Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers 
in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume 
that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate 
the information requisite to support an independent 
judicial assessment of probable cause. 
 
401 U.S. at 568. 
 
In Hensley, the Court wrote: 
 
If the flyer has been issued in the absence of a 
reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective 
reliance upon it violates the Fourth Amendment. In 
such a situation, of course, the officers making the 
stop may have a good-faith defense to any civil suit. It 
is the objective reading of the flyer or bulletin that 
determines whether other police officers can defensibly 
act in reliance on it. 
 
469 U.S. 232-33 (emphasis added). Thus we concluded in 
Capone: 
 
Given that the . . . bulletin expressly states that a 
warrant existed for the arrest of Capone, as well as the 
nature of the alleged offenses . . . [the] officer['s] 
reliance upon the bulletin cannot be said to have been 
unreasonable. Therefore, as a matter of law, the 
protection of qualified immunity . . . extends to[the 
officer]. 
 
868 F.2d at 106. These cases teach us that the actions of 
a police officer acting in reliance on what proves to be the 
flawed conclusions of a fellow police officer may be 
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reasonable nonetheless and thus protected by the doctrine 
of qualified immunity. 
 
Although Capone dealt with the objective reading of a 
written flyer or bulletin, we see no reason why the same 
analysis should not be used in considering oral statements. 
Therefore, we hold that where a police officer makes an 
arrest on the basis of oral statements by fellow officers, an 
officer will be entitled to qualified immunity from liability in 
a civil rights suit for unlawful arrest provided it was 
objectively reasonable for him to believe, on the basis of the 
statements, that probable cause for the arrest existed. 
 
B. Immunity in this Case 
 
1. Edwards 
 
Edwards acted in reliance on statements made by Davy 
and Miller concerning the existence of an outstanding 
arrest warrant for Rogers in Lycoming County. The relevant 
question is whether it was objectively reasonable for him to 
believe, on the basis of the statements, that probable cause 
existed for the arrest. Unlike the officers in Capone, 
Edwards never received a clear statement from a fellow law 
enforcement officer confirming the existence of probable 
cause for the suspect's arrest. The content of the 
statements made by Davy and Miller merely related rumors 
that were circulating about Rogers. The statements never 
confirmed the existence of an arrest warrant for Rogers in 
Lycoming County. Statements made by Miller regarding the 
existence of summary warrants in Clinton County were 
sufficiently clear; however those statements are not relevant 
since the summary warrants were not the basis for 
Edwards' arrest of Rogers. 
 
Given the facts before us and in the absence of any 
statement confirming the existence of probable cause or a 
warrant itself, we do not believe that Edwards' reliance on 
the statements was reasonable. Thus, as a matter of law it 
was not objectively reasonable for Edwards to believe that 
probable cause existed for the arrest and hence Edwards is 
not protected against Rogers' § 1983 claim by the doctrine 
of qualified immunity. Accordingly, we will reverse the 
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district court's order granting summary judgment as to 
Edwards.8 
 
2. Eiler 
 
Eiler acted in reliance on the statements of Edwards. 
Unlike the vague statements of Davy and Miller, the 
statements made by Edwards to the other troopers involved 
were clear, and unambiguously related the existence of an 
arrest warrant for Rogers in Lycoming County. The 
circumstances surrounding Eiler's participation in Rogers' 
arrest are very similar to the circumstances in Capone and 
as a matter of law we find that it was objectively reasonable 
for Eiler to believe that probable cause existed for the 
arrest. 
 
Although the district court wrongly granted summary 
judgment as to Eiler on the basis of a finding of probable 
cause for the arrest, we will affirm the order on the 
alternative grounds that having participated in the unlawful 
arrest of Rogers, Eiler is nonetheless shielded from civil 
liability for the § 1983 claim by the doctrine of qualified 
immunity. See Williams v. Stone, 109 F.3d 890, 891 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (affirming the judgment of the district court, 
although on different grounds than those relied upon by 
the district court). 
 
3. Powell and Stine 
 
Our holding as to Eiler largely controls our analysis of 
qualified immunity for Powell and Stine. Powell and Stine 
acted on the basis of the statements made by Edwards and 
conveyed by the Lycoming County dispatcher Pfleegor, 
stating that Rogers needed to be transported to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Despite our conclusions that the arrest of Rogers was unlawful and 
that Edwards is not shielded from liability by the doctrine of qualified 
immunity, we do not enter summary judgment for Rogers. The district 
court never ruled on Rogers' motion for summary judgment, and hence 
Rogers was not able to appeal the issue to this court. We recognize 
precedent which, broadly construed, suggests that we could 
appropriately enter summary judgment for Rogers in this instance. See 
Schmidt v. Farm Credit Services, 977 F.2d 511, 513 n.3 (10th Cir. 1992). 
However we decline to do so and instead remand the matter to the 
district court for decision in the first instance. 
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Lycoming County Prison pursuant to an arrest warrant. It 
was objectively reasonable for Powell and Stine to believe, 
on the basis of those statements, that probable cause 
existed for the arrest of Rogers. Thus, for the initial period 
of time that Powell and Stine held Rogers, they are 
protected from Rogers' § 1983 claim by the doctrine of 
qualified immunity. 
 
Powell and Stine do not enjoy qualified immunity, 
however, beyond the time at which assistant district 
attorney Butts communicated to them that there was no 
reason to hold Rogers in custody. Continuing to hold an 
individual in handcuffs once it has been determined that 
there was no lawful basis for the initial seizure is unlawful 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See United 
States v. Shareef, 100 F.3d 1491, 1507 (10th Cir. 1996). Of 
course, we recognize the possibility of some additional 
basis, independent of that claimed to support the initial 
seizure, that could support an official continuing to hold an 
individual in handcuffs. However, no such basis exists here.9 
As noted, Powell and Stine failed to remove the handcuffs 
from Rogers when they learned from their conversation with 
Butts that there was no basis for holding him, but rather 
detained him for an additional period time. For this reason 
they are not immunized from a § 1983 claim by Rogers 
regarding this final interval of time. Accordingly, we affirm 
in part and reverse in part the district court's order 
granting summary judgment as to Powell and Stine. The 
precise length of the additional holding period cannot be 
determined from the evidence contained in the record and 
will have to be decided on remand. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Eiler will be affirmed. The 
court's order granting summary judgment as to Edwards 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Even assuming, without so holding, that the officers might have been 
justified in leaving the handcuffs on Rogers while transporting him to 
Clinton County had Rogers' behavior posed a threat of some kind during 
that time, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Rogers posed 
such a threat, nor did the appellees raise such an argument in these 
proceedings. 
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will be reversed. The grant of summary judgment as to 
Powell and Stine will be affirmed in part but also reversed 
in part, and the cases against Edwards, Powell, and Stine 
will be remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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